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Introduction
Becoming a member of the WTO is not just a question of "raising one's hand". Accession is subject to a complex negotiation process, which is costly and which involves demands from existing member countries that applicant countries do not necessarily consider to be in their own immediate interest. Perhaps inevitably, bilateral or regional arrangements may often seem more attractive than WTO membership. The accession commitments relate to market access, as well as policy rules not directly related to trade. Both add up to something like a "price" for WTO membership. 1 Although the price-tag is negotiable, the negotiating process is somewhat lopsided in favor of existing members. Moreover, there is evidence that the price has risen through time;
see Evenett & Primo Braga (2005) . Yet, countries are willing to pay this "price", so there must be a bene…t. Arguably, the most important and immediate bene…t is an expected increase in exports to existing member countries, beyond the levels that would otherwise be reached.
In turn, the "price" that incumbents charge for accepting a new member must be worth something for them as well. Again, it is the expected rise in exports to new member countries. This is in line with what Krugman (1991) has dubbed "GATT think", essentially a two-sided mercantilist obsession with increasing ones exports. However, it is enlightened mercantilism in that the principle of reciprocating market access concessions gives indirect leverage to consumer interests (in cheap imports), which would otherwise be victimized in the domestic political process by dominating producer-interests (in large export market) in both countries. Adding severe restrictions on the use of export subsidies, a further important cornerstone of "GATT think", this enlightened mercantilism unleashes forces towards freer trade. 2 Under reasonable conditions, but not inevitably, it also leads to more trade.
According to this logic, one would expect that WTO accession boosts bilateral trade 1 In the most recent accession (November 2006), Vietnam's commitments run up to almost 700 pages of text related to slashing trade barriers, ending subsidies, ensuring protection of property rights etc. 2 More recently, this logic of the GATT/WTO has been formalized by Bagwell & Staiger (2003) .
Throughout this paper, we use the term WTO to mean both the WTO and the GATT. All GATT agreements were absorbed by the WTO which came into existence in 1995, based on the Uruguayround agreement under the GATT. 1 between acceding and existing member countries. In particular, WTO membership is commonly regarded as a key vehicle to integrate less developed countries into the world trading system, and thus to enhance their growth and development perspectives. Did the WTO deliver on this account? This question, of course, has many dimensions, and there is no easy answer. But surely, the GATT/WTO should at least have had a trade-promoting in ‡uence. Despite the general perception of the GATT and the WTO as key forces behind the enormous increase in world trade observed after World War II, identifying a statistically signi…cant e¤ect of WTO membership on the volume of bilateral trade turns out to be harder than expected. Several approaches have been pursued in the literature, with varying results. 3 Perhaps the most important and widely recognized study is Rose (2004a) who searches for a signi…cant e¤ect of WTO membership on the level of bilateral trade in a conventional econometric analysis of a large panel of data covering 50 years and 175 countries, controlling for other determinants as suggested by the gravity theory of trade. Summarizing an extensive investigation exploring many perturbations of the data, Rose concludes, at the time, that "we currently do not have strong empirical evidence that the GATT/WTO has systematically played a strong role in encouraging trade".
Given the aforementioned logic that underlies the GATT, it is not surprising that Rose's …ndings have caught a great deal of attention. They seem to cast doubt on the GATT/WTO as a "success story"that exempli…es the virtues of multilateral trade liberalization. At a time when countries increasingly seem to turn their back on the multilateral system for the sake of regional trade arrangements, the results must seem like bad news for those who preach the bene…ts of multilateralism. However, farreaching policy conclusions don't seem warranted. Indeed, it is not even clear whether we have a puzzle. There are several potential explanations for Rose's results, some of them perhaps more worrying than others. Hence, we need more research. In a companion paper, Rose (2004b) has shed further light on the issue by examining whether GATT/WTO member-countries have systematically followed more liberal trade policies than non-members. And his conclusion, again, is that "there is little evidence that membership in the GATT/WTO has actually liberalized trade policy". This seems like a consistent explanation of the results in Rose (2004a) , but it also seems to make them more worrying. After all, fostering more liberal trade policies was the GATT's, and still is the WTO's primary mandate. And the presumption underlying the a-priori 3 Brief surveys may be found in Evenett & Gage (2005) and Rose (2006) . 2 expectation that membership should promote trade is that this mandate has indeed largely been ful…lled.
But the message is not as devastating as may appear at …rst sight. As Rose (2004b) himself aptly points out, it is important to be aware of a subtle distinction. It may be true that, given the existence of the GATT/WTO, member countries do not pursue systematically more liberal trade policies than non-members. But this does not mean that these policies are less liberal than they would be without the presence of the GATT/WTO as an institution. We probably don't know enough about the counterfactual to reach a …rm conclusion on this latter question. In particular, it would certainly be strange to argue, on the basis of Rose (2004b) , that the world would be a better place without the GATT/WTO. But still, the "policies-explanation" of Rose (2004a) that Rose (2004b) apparently o¤ers seems to raise a somewhat worrying specter.
However, in this paper we do not want to explore any of the issues related to the "policies-explanation" of Rose (2004a) . Instead, we want to go back to the initial results related to trade as such. It must be pointed out that Rose (2004a) has tried out a large number of empirical methodologies on di¤erent partitions of his data set in order to reach a robust story. He is careful to point out that the data do tell partial stories where GATT/WTO membership seems to have promoted bilateral trade. But the evidence in his view does not add up to a convincing story of a systematic overall positive in ‡uence of membership on trade. 4 Several authors have since re-addressed the issue, and have come to di¤erent conclusions. In his summary of "what happened afterwards", Rose (2006) identi…es three dimensions in which his earlier conclusion might need revision. The …rst relates to "excessive pooling" in the country-, time-, or industry-dimension. In our view, the question here is whether there is enough systematic variation across countries, times, or industries, that would allow us to come up with a helpful and interesting explanation of why GATT/WTO membership fails to exhibit a systematic in ‡uence in the full panel. The time-dimension has been explored quite extensively already in Rose (2004a) , and the sector-dimension would seem rather obvious, given the "classical" GATTexemptions for sectors like textiles and agriculture. 5 Exploring the country-dimension, 4 Rose (2005) compares the GATT/WTO with the IMF and the OECD. Following essentially the same strategy as in Rose (2004a) , he …nds that it is even harder to …nd such in ‡uence of membership in the IMF, whereas OECD-membership does seem to have had a positive e¤ect on bilateral trade. 5 Rose (2006) surveys other attempts at disentangling speci…c time and sector e¤ects.
3 Subramanian and Wei (2006) conclude that GATT/WTO membership promotes trade mainly, and strongly, for industrial countries, but not for developing countries. 6 Interestingly, their explanation partly runs along the aforementioned "policies-explanation".
They argue that industrial countries have simply made more out of their GATT/WTO membership in terms of trade liberalization attempts. A related point is that the GATT/WTO may have served as a trade-liberalizing catalyst also for countries who are not (yet) formal members; see Tomz et al. (2005) .
The second potential "revisionist"point relates to whether evidence in the time dimension should deserve more con…dence than evidence in the cross-country dimension.
In some sense the point is technical in nature, essentially relying on the presumption of unobserved country-(or even dyad-) heterogeneity which makes the OLS panelestimator biased. In terms of substance, an important dimension of unobserved heterogeneity in the usual gravity speci…cation is, of course, trade policy. In the present context, it would seem natural to generalize the trade-costs in the "multilateral resistance" terms of the Anderson & van Wincoop (2003) gravity equation. These are normally motivated by distance related costs, and used to argue for country-speci…c …xed e¤ects. They might obviously be generalized to also represent trade policies of the importer-and the exporter-country.
However, in one of his speci…cations Rose (2004a) did in fact include dyad-speci…c …xed e¤ects (which nest importer and exporter …xed e¤ects), thus looking only at "within variation" in the time-dimension. And in these speci…cations, he did …nd slightly more pro-trade evidence of GATT/WTO membership than in others. But the estimated coe¢ cient was very small, hence this point o¤ers very little comfort.
The results obtained by Subramanian & Wei (2006) , who also stress the importance of country-pair …xed e¤ects, thus seem to be due more to the distinction between developed and developing countries than to the more general country-…xed e¤ects. But there is a question of interpretation that arises in this regard. If the GATT/WTO's prime mandate is to foster more liberal trade policy, why should we expect to …nd any additional trade-promoting in ‡uence, once we control for trade policies via …xed e¤ects? To the best of our knowledge, this question has not been addressed so far in the literature. We address it in the model that we propose below.
The third line of criticism acknowledged by Rose (2006) relates to a potential se- 6 Subramanian & Wei (2006) is a shortened version of their NBER working paper of 2003. 4 lection bias. By ignoring all country pairs where trade is zero, Rose (2004a) has also ignored a potentially important trade-promoting in ‡uence of GATT/WTO membership. Members may trade with more countries than non-members, and a country may experience an increase in the number of trading partners once becoming a member of the GATT/WTO. This is the so called extensive margin of world trade, as opposed to the intensive margin relating to how non-zero trade varies across countries and time.
We have argued elsewhere that excluding the extensive margin generates biased estimates, and we have included it via Tobit estimation techniques; see Felbermayr & Kohler (2006) . In one of our speci…cations we have found evidence of a trade-promoting in ‡uence of GATT/WTO membership. 7 In this paper, we intend to undertake a more comprehensive search for GATT/WTO membership e¤ects at the extensive margin. 8 Indeed, the concluding words by Rose (2006) which we use in our subsequent econometric estimation. Section 4 reports a series of heuristic results on the role of GATT/WTO membership at the extensive margin that we have extracted from our data, without resorting to the gravity equation. In section 5, we turn to an econometric analysis of the gravity equation, based on the corner solutions model of section 2. We …rst con…rm Rose (2004a) in showing that our data do not reveal a strong and robust e¤ect of WTO membership on the intensive margin of bilateral trade. Subsequently, we put pieces together and 7 Our prime interest in that paper was not GATT/WTO membership, but the so-called "distance puzzle". Evidence of a GATT/WTO e¤ect on the extensive margin was also found by Helpman, Melitz & Rubinstein (2006) or Liu (2006) . estimate our corner solutions gravity model. We …nd the extensive margin to make a di¤erence in two ways. Excluding zero trade observations does, indeed, give rise to a downward-bias of the relevant WTO-coe¢ cient; and WTO membership does promote trade at the extensive margin.
A simple model of the extensive margin
The standard gravity model of bilateral trade is based on Dixit-Stiglitz-type product di¤erentiation and monopolistic competition, whereby researchers normally assume iceberg-type variable trade costs. These are meant to capture natural barriers to trade, related to distance and transport, as well as policy-induced barriers such as tari¤s.
The problem with this model is that it does not allow for zero trade between any two countries, hence there is no extensive margin. However, the extensive margin becomes important as soon as there are …xed costs of exporting, and if these costs are speci…c to the market served. Following Baldwin (1988) , we refer to such costs as beachhead costs. 9 Helpman et al. (2006) show that the combination of beachhead costs and …rm level heterogeneity in productivity, combined with cross-country variation in e¢ ciency, implies that any given country need not serve all foreign markets. This is a natural point of departure to model the WTO at the extensive margin.
In particular, we argue that -other things equal -joint WTO membership of the exporter and importer country should lower variable trade costs, as well as the beachhead costs of exporting. For instance, beachhead costs may be due to a certain likelihood that a certain destination country disrupts trade, for instance to alleviate perceived temporary pressure from import competition. Ex ante, an exporting …rm may thus face a higher likelihood of periodic temporary reductions in pro…ts from exporting to non-WTO-countries than to a WTO country, provided the exporter country itself is a member. There are several reasons for this, and we do not go into details here. Suf-…ce it to mention the host of rules-related policy commitments entered upon accession (see Evenett & Primo Braga, 2005) , as well as GATT/WTO-type tari¤-bindings and 9 Fixed export costs have become important in the recent extension of the monopolistic competition model to heterogenous …rms; see Melitz (2003) and Helpman et al. (2006) . There are other ways to model the extensive margin, but the beachhead cost model proves convenient for the present purpose. In Felbermayr & Kohler (2006) , we have proposed an argument based on public infrastructure investment, rather than private costs of exporting. 6 the reduction of uncertainty a¤orded by the WTO rules on safeguard-protection, antidumping-provisions, and trade related intellectual property rights (or property rights more generally). In an intertemporal model, GATT/WTO membership would thus a¤ect the present value of future pro…ts from exporting. Here, we take a short-cut and model this as lower beachhead costs in a static monopolistic competition model of exporting.
Suppose the world consists of C countries, i = 1; :::; C, which di¤er only with respect to their aggregate e¢ ciency, which we denote by (c i ) 1 . For simplicity, assume that labor is the only factor of production, and …rms produce di¤erent varieties of a single good, whereby all consumers have identical Dixit-Stiglitz-type CES preferences, with 1= (1 ) > 1 describing the elasticity of substitution between any two (symmetric) varieties. Firms have constant, but di¤erent marginal labor input requirements per unit of output, denoted by a. We assume that a is distributed according to some cumulative distribution function G (a) ; which is identical across countries and has support [a L ; a H ]. Notice that the variable a relates to the …rm's distinct own variety. We simplify by using a to also index producers and, thus, varieties according to the Dixit-Stiglitz utility function. Since G(a) is identical across countries, we abstain from additionally indexing a by the producer-country.
For the sake of simplicity, we abstain from determining entry and exit of …rms as such. We assume a given number of N i …rms in country i, all of which are actively selling on their home market. We refer to Melitz (2003) for a mechanism determining the continuous analogue to our N i . In this mechanism, N i would be in ‡uenced by the prospect of exporting through an aggregate zero-pro…t condition, including pro…ts on exporting. Our partial equilibrium model thus squarely focuses on the extensive margin of exporting. 10 In our exposition, we closely follow Helpman (2006) .
Denoting the c.i.f.-price for a good of variety k in country j by p j k , demand for this variety may be written as
In this expression, 10 It is worth pointing out at this stage that it is beachhead costs, not …rm-level heterogeneity, that
give rise to the extensive margin of trade on the country-level, separating positive-trade from zerotrade partner countries. Firm-level heterogeneity introduces an extensive margin of exporting within each country, where …rms engaged in serving a speci…c foreign market are separated from those who don't. While not necessary for the extensive country-margin, assuming …rm-level heterogeneity adds some realism to our model, and it facilitates an easier interpretation against the backdrop of existing literature.
Y j is equal to country j's expenditure on goods, and P j is the unit-expenditure function (or exact price index), depending on prices of all varieties served to market j. 11 Since each producer manufactures a unique variety, she has market power. Following established tradition, we assume that each producer in country i treats P j (i = 1; :::; C) as given, thus perceiving a price elasticity of demand equal to : Normalizing the wage to unity, marginal costs of a producer a are equal to c i a, and her pro…t-maximizing "ex-factory"price is equal to c i a= , where 1= > 1 is the usual markup factor.
Firms in country i who consider to serve consumers in country j must incur …xed beachhead costs equal to c i f ij ; depending on the identity of the exporter (i) and the importer (j) country. 12 Notice that these costs also depend on the exporter country's aggregate e¢ ciency parameter c i . Besides the beachhead costs, there are variable trade costs of the usual iceberg type, denoted by ij 1: Domestic sales do not require any of these costs, whence ij = 1 and f jj = 0: The pro…t-maximizing c.i.f.-price in country j is then equal to c i a ij = .
By assumption, all …rms are active on their domestic markets where there are no trade costs. Additional pro…ts to be earned by exporting from country i to country j depend on a …rm's e¢ ciency and are given by
where B j A j (1 ) 1 . Note that from a single …rm's perspective B j is given, hence pro…ts are linear in (c i ij a) 1 , whereby B j is a measure of the size of the foreign market j. The marginal …rm which just breaks even on exports to foreign market j is determined by the condition ij (a) = 0: This gives rise to a cut-o¤ value
and it is increasing in the size of the foreign market B j . It also increases in the exporting country i's overall e¢ ciency 1=c i ; while falling with higher beachhead costs f ij , and higher variable trade costs ij . All of this is intuitive.
A country-i-…rm with a < a ij will have export sales to country j equal to (c i a ij = )
In this expression, the integral is the "Melitz-aggregator" which allows us to describe aggregate exports in the face of …rm-level heterogeneity, given N i , the exogenous number of producing …rms in country i. Notice, however, that ij is positive only if a ij > a L .
It is zero if a ij = a L , and negative if a ij < a L . Hence, the expected value of exports from country i to country j obeys 13
With a constant elasticity of substitution, export revenues and pro…ts are driven by the same variables, except for beachhead costs which matter only for pro…ts. Since we normally cannot measure beachhead costs, expression (4) can be understood as a corner solution model; see Felbermayr & Kohler (2006) .
It is convenient to de…ne a function ij (a ij ) R a ij a L a 1 dG (a). We now assume this function to be of the same shape for all country-pairs, and we venture the bold assumption of a log-linear form, so that ln ij (a ij ) 0 + ln a ij . Using (2), we then have
Inserting into the expression of our latent variable ij , we obtain
where ij 0 0 + ln( 1 A j N i ). Notice that > 1 by assumption. (4). The 13 Obviously, in this model negative exports may not be interpreted as imports. 9 underlying assumption is that country j is a WTO member. A "within-variation" at the intensive margin can now be depicted as ln ij = (1 ) ln ij
whereby the variable and beachhead cost values marked 1 (0) indicate a situation where country i has (not yet) become a member of the WTO. A "within-variation" at the extensive margin would be observed for some other country l, starting out from a higher value of real trade costs lj 0 , where the same beachheadcost-reduction from country j joining the WTO alone would su¢ ce to "wake up" a dormant trading relationship. A "between-variation" at the extensive margin would be observed between countries k and l, both having the same level of real trade costs kj 0 = lj 0 , but with country k being a member of the GATT/WTO while country l is not. It is obvious that any such "between-variation"could also be caused by di¤erences in overall e¢ ciencies c k and c l .
We shall use this corner-solutions model of bilateral exports, in order to specify a gravity equation which we then estimate on a panel data set comparable to Rose (2004a) . Details on that speci…cation, as well as the estimation strategy will follow below. What we want to do next is provide some descriptive evidence on the importance of the extensive margin in post-war evolution of world trade, and to investigate by means of simple heuristic techniques whether GATT/WTO membership appears to play a role at the extensive margin. We de…ne a trading relationship either as a directed dyad (exports from i to j) or as undirected dyads (exports in both directions, i.e., from i to j plus j to i). In the following, we also call an undirected dyad a bilateral trading relationship. In the …rst case we have 104 103 = 10; 712 country pairs per year, while in the second we have half that number, i.e., 5; 356: Clearly, as we move towards more recent "vintages", the cumulative contribution of the extensive margin becomes smaller and smaller. 16 Overall, …gures 3.1 through 3.3 clearly suggest that the extensive margin has played a non-negligible role for the total growth of world trade from 1966 up to 2004.
WTO membership at the extensive margin: heuristic evidence
In this section, we …rst explore "heuristic evidence"on WTO membership at the extensive margin of world trade that may be extracted without relying on a fully speci…ed corner-solutions gravity-model of trade. We …rst take a cross-sectional perspective, and then turn to the time-series dimension. Table 4 17 Given that the sample mean of the number of trading partners is 57, the non-linear results imply that WTO members have between 5.1 and 6.8 more trading partners than non-members. Note that these results are robust to omitted variables bias to the extent that those are time-invariant.
Countries with more trading relationships need not necessarily have a more diver-si…ed trade pattern. We have argued above that trade with a fellow WTO member country involves a lower risk of unexpected policy interference or enforcement problems. We have crudely modelled this through country-pair-speci…c beachhead costs.
However, depending on the underlying correlation structure, …rms might also be able to deal with this type of risk through diversifying their export destinations. As a result, WTO members would feel less pressure to diversify their trade structure and would converge to a less diversi…ed structure of trade which is more in line with the pattern of comparative advantage. At the same time, if WTO membership goes hand in hand with decreased trade costs, new trading partners may become attractive destinations, thus leading to a lower degree of concentration. A priori, the e¤ect would seem ambiguous. To obtain a …rst rough idea on which of the two e¤ects was dominant in post-war development of trade, we compute the Her…ndahl index of export concentration. 18 Figure 4 .1 suggests that WTO membership is indeed associated with lower levels of export concentration.
We run a simple linear regression model to check whether the pattern depicted in …gure 4.1 survives conditioning on covariates, such as the country's GDP, its remoteness 17 On the di¤erential interpretation of exponential and negative binomial models, see Wooldridge (2002, p. 646-653). 18 The Her…ndahl index for country i is de…ned as
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(measured by average distance of country i from its trading partners), total GDP of the world economy, and the total number of WTO members. Table 4 .3 reveals that WTO membership is associated with a lower degree of concentration. But, though statistically signi…cant and robust, the e¤ect is rather small. WTO members have a concentration measure which is between 0:012 and 0:015 points lower than that of non-members. Given that the average degree of concentration is 0:20, the conclusion is that WTO membership does not make a large di¤erence across countries for the destination-country-concentration of exports.
Finally, we turn to the time series dimension, asking whether WTO membership comes with a higher likelihood for a dormant trading relationship to rise into activity. 
WTO membership: an econometric analysis
The heuristic evidence of the preceding section seems to indicate that GATT/WTO membership matters at the extensive margin of trade creation. However, while we did include some covariates here and there, we certainly did not control for other determinants of trade in any systematic way. It is worth remembering that Rose (2004a) was able to estimate a highly signi…cant positive e¤ect of GATT/WTO membership ceteris non paribus, i.e., leaving other factors uncontrolled for in the procedure. The point was that the e¤ect has all but vanished, once standard gravity e¤ects have been allowed to enter the stage. Of course, there are several ways to bring structural determinants of trade into the picture, and any single approach is unlikely to capture them all. But arguably, the gravity approach is the most convincing one in this context, for at least two reasons. First, unlike the traditional theory of comparative advantage, it is able to explain not only a country's global trade, but also its bilateral trade. And secondly, it has been remarkably successful empirically, consistently throughout several decades of applied research.
However, although we have alluded to the gravity approach in section 2 above, equation (6) is not yet a gravity equation, ready for estimation. The variables c i ; ij and f ij will all be replaced by appropriate proxy variables. This is essentially a question of data availability and e¢ ciency of estimation; see below. On a conceptual level, we need to close the model in two di¤erent ways. First, for the exporter country i, we must impose a factor market clearing condition which gets rid of N i for the sake of country i's GDP and the price and output of its variety. And secondly, we need to solve for P j the overall price index for the destination country, which is a complex function of all c.i.f. prices. This introduces a comprehensive interdependency across all exporter countries'values for c i ; ij and f ij (i = 1; :::; C). We refer to Feenstra (2004) for a convenient summary of how an estimable gravity equation might be derived. The speci…cation that we eventually employ may be written as
where is a constant, i and j are exporter and importer …xed e¤ects, and u ij is an error term with the conventional properties. The other variables on the right are selfexplanatory dummies, with BOTHIN ij and ONEIN ij indicating GATT/WTO membership and FTA ij indicating joint membership in a regional trading block. With the existence of a time dimension, we need to include time-varying …xed e¤ects as in particular the two country's GDP. 19 In this way, all terms appearing in ij 0 in equation (6) are eventually covered by …xed e¤ects, while the forces behind c i ; ij and f ij are taken up by the usual resistance dummies of the gravity equation (joint FTA membership, geographical distance, adjacency, and common language), amended by the WTO dummy which is the prime focus of our analysis. Equation (7) is not ready for estimation, since it involves latent trade as a dependent variable. Adding (4) Estimates based on non-zero trade ‡ows alone, i.e., the intensive margin estimates, will be biased downward nonetheless.
In line with the arguments in Felbermayr & Kohler (2006) , we estimate our cornersolutions model employing a Tobit estimation approach. This allows us to disentangle the two margins, which seems important also with respect to the in ‡uence of GATT/WTO membership on world trade. In particular, writing Z ij t for the entire explanatory variables, the expected value of bilateral exports, conditional on X ij t can be decomposed according to
Tobit estimation allows us to present separate marginal coe¢ cients for both terms on the right-hand side, the …rst being the traditional intensive margin, the second being the extensive margin. In the subsequent presentation of results, we report marginal e¤ects on Pr X ij t > 0jZ ij compelling for the case of WTO membership, because it could go the other way round as well: A country that receives some positive exogenous shock trades more than the natural level indicated by the gravity equation. That additional trade may make it more valuable to join the WTO, since transparency and predictability of partners' trade policy may now be more valuable. Moreover, the recipe proposed by Baier & Bergstrand (2006) in order to counter the omitted variables problem, namely the use of dyadic …xed e¤ects, appears questionable for the WTO context, for the simple reason that the WTO is a multilateral, not a bilateral system. We follow common practice in using time-varying …xed e¤ects to capture multilateral trade resistance; see Anderson & van Wincoop (2003) and Feenstra (2004) . This also takes care of the unobserved heterogeneity on the country level that may a¤ect the decision to join the WTO (such as positive shocks discussed above).
A few words on the data, before we proceed to the estimation results. We have clipped the data to the extent necessary in order to obtain a balanced panel. We use the exporter country GDP-de ‡ator to compute real trade ‡ows. Real GDP values are taken from the World Development Indicators. Data on geographical distance, adjacency, and common language are from CEPII, Paris. The FTA dummy was constructed following Baier and Bergstrand (2006) . The appendix provides the usual summary statistics for data.
Throughout all our speci…cations, we use bilateral exports as the dependent variable. Note that the inclusion of …xed e¤ects renders GDP-variables as covariates redundant. We have pursued the following estimation strategy. The …rst stage of our strategy involves looking only at "between-evidence" in cross country estimations for several sample years with 10-year-intervals. The second stage then moves on to panel estimates, thus adding the "within-perspective". In both stages, we …rst look at simple OLS estimates from country-pairs with positive trade (intensive margin), mainly for the purpose of comparison with existing literature, in particular Rose (2004a) . Subsequently, we undertake a Probit estimation for the extensive margin in isolation, and in a …nal step we complete each of the two stages with a joint treatment of the extensive and intensive margin via Tobit estimation. As to the WTO membership e¤ects, we continue to …nd estimates that are unstable quantitatively, and mostly insigni…cant statistically. The conclusion from the cross sectional evidence is that there is no evidence for a positive and sizeable WTO e¤ect on bilateral trade. In other words, moving from the non-zero trade ‡ow model of Rose From the previous work brie ‡y surveyed in our introduction, it consistently tran- 20 For instance, compare our …ndings to Baier and Bergstrand (2006) , table 1. 21 This is, admittedly, inelegant. However, semilog gravity models tend to perform very poorly. In Felbermayr and Kohler (2006) we argue that adding constants other than unity to bilateral trade values does not substantially alter the results. The simple approach of adding one makes the Tobit model comparable to the conventional non-zero gravity model, an advantage that would be lost if nonlinear methods were used. Liu (2006) follows Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and runs a Poisson model to account for the extensive margin in a gravity model. spires that drawing on time-series variation makes …nding robust and meaningful WTO membership e¤ects somewhat easier. 22 To see if this hold in our case as well, we move to stage two of our strategy, exploiting the time-series ("within") dimension of the data, jointly with the cross-sectional ("between") variation. As regards WTO membership, we face the di¢ culty of appropriately timing the start of the "treatment e¤ect". Countries might undertake steps towards trade liberalization in the run-up towards joining the WTO, and they could be allowed considerable transition periods after joining. 23 To avoid these complications, instead of using 40 years of data (from 1965 to 2004), we use only …ve years (1965, 1975, 1985, 1995, and 2004 ). Table 5 .2 reports our …ndings for stage two of our estimation strategy, i.e., panel regressions. As argued above, consistent estimation of the gravity equation requires inclusion of time-varying …xed e¤ects, in addition to a rigorous treatment of the extensive margin. 24 We organize our presentation around the inclusion/exclusion of …xed e¤ects (FE). The …rst three columns exclude all country-…xed e¤ects, which corresponds to the baseline method used by Rose (2004a) . Columns (4) through (6) include timeinvariant …xed e¤ects as in Felbermayr and Kohler (2006) , and …nally, columns (7) through (9) Over all speci…cations, the behavior of estimates other than those for WTO membership are largely in line with the literature. Column (1) is a variant of Rose's (2004a) base model, restricted to positive trade ‡ows (intensive margin only) and estimated 22 For a more detailed survey, see Rose (2006) . 23 It is not uncommon to observe a 10 year time span for accession negotiations; see Evenett & Primo Braga (2005) . It seems plausible to assume that some policy changes are enacted beforehand, in order to solve the inherent commitment problem. At the same time, it is well known that new members are sometimes slow in honoring commitments entered during negotiation, China being a prominent example in this regard. 24 In the descriptive analysis, we carefully avoid the pseudo-intensive margin and focus on a balanced panel of country pairs that have existed from 1965 onwards. In the econometric exercise, for reasons of comparison, we stick to the same sample of countries. The panel is (potentially) unbalanced, because for some pairs trade is missing. Availability of GDP data is not an issue whenever we use time-varying …xed e¤ects. 25 Fixed e¤ects always means a dummy for country i as an exporter and a dummy for country j as an importer, and not dyad-speci…c dummies. over 5 years of data rather than over 50 years. We also use a somewhat shorter list of covariates, and -perhaps most importantly -use directed exports, rather than total bilateral trade as a dependent variable. Rose's main …nding are upheld: There is no e¤ect of WTO membership on trade. However, looking at the extensive margin with a Probit model, as in column (2), we do …nd a positive e¤ect, and the same holds for the Tobit model in column (3) . The Probit e¤ect is fairly small, implying that WTO membership increases the likelihood of positive trade by 1.1-fold, a mere 10 percent.
However, the Tobit estimate is large: WTO membership increases exports from one member to the other by 2.5-fold: e 0:941 = 2:56, or a 156% increase.
In line with Felbermayr & Kohler (2006) , columns (4) to (6) The speci…cation in columns (7) to (9) is fully consistent with theory and yields consistent estimates for membership e¤ects. Interestingly, we now …nd a positive membership e¤ect also in the conventional, positive-trade-only regression. The order of magnitude -a 19 percent increase -is similar to that found in frameworks with time-invariant …xed e¤ects in Rose (2004a) . The Probit estimate reveals a signi…cant e¤ect also at the extensive margin, albeit very small in magnitude. Finally, the corner-solutions model implies that joint WTO membership boosts bilateral exports on average by 31 percent (e 0:267 = 1:31).
It is interesting to look at the ONEIN-e¤ects, although there seems to be a less clear cut theoretical prediction for these than for the BOTHIN-e¤ects. Yet, there is a relatively clear picture that emerges from table 5.2. ONEIN-coe¢ cients tend to be signi…cant in the same speci…cations where BOTHIN is signi…cant. Moreover, where signi…cant at all, the ONEIN-coe¢ cients are both, larger and have lower standard errors of estimate than the BOTHIN-estimates, the sole exception being the OLS-intensivemargin with time-varying …xed e¤ects in column (7) .
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Having allowed for the extensive margin of world trade to "speak out", can we be con…dent that WTO membership is worth its "price", more than Rose's (2004a) initial work seemed to suggest? Can we conclude that "GATT think" has, after all, been working during adult phases of the GATT/WTO's life? Working in the sense that countries did reveal more trade, once becoming members, and more trade than countries outside the GATT/WTO? Or does controlling for gravity determinants of bilateral trade continue to destroy all evidence that would support the commonly held view that membership is trade promoting, even if we allow membership to play a role also at the extensive margin of world trade?
In our view the answer is a "quali…ed yes". Yes, because Probit and Tobit estimations did indeed yield more, and more signi…cantly positive coe¢ cient estimates for our BOTHIN-dummies. And the order or magnitude revealed is not negligibly small. But quali…ed, because the Probit and Tobit estimates are smaller and less signi…cant in the speci…cation with time-varying country-…xed-e¤ects, which is the preferred speci…cation on theoretical grounds unrelated to WTO membership. More generally, one would have wished the e¤ects to be more robust across di¤erent …xed-e¤ects-speci…cations, or to show up more in the preferred speci…cation than vice versa. Quali…ed also because the ONEIN-e¤ect which seems much less clear theoretically comes out more signi…cantly than the BOTHIN-e¤ect that we have argued in our own theoretical reasoning. And quali…ed also because the evidence in favor of a WTO membership e¤ect seems mainly concentrated in the "within-variation". But although one might have wished the evidence to show up more consistently in both dimensions, here one can argue to be on the safe side, since there are fundamental theoretical reasons that we have indicated in the introduction for "within-evidence" to be more trustworthy than "between-evidence".
Abstaining from jargon, what is the message that we have for negotiators and policy makers? It would be silly trying to distill a sharp conclusion regarding practical problems in accession negotiations and decision making. But, although we do not feel like having a powerful and convincing "revisionist story" to tell with respect to the initial …ndings in Rose (2004a), we do have some noteworthy evidence to present.
The logic that drives WTO-membership applications and negotiations does, after all, …nd some empirical support in a comprehensive statistical analysis of overall world trade, support that goes beyond individual success stories or a cleverly chosen subset of countries. Based on our analysis, countries who are up for membership may be expected to trade somewhat more with existing member countries, and with more of them, than would otherwise be the case. The magnitude of the e¤ect may not be deemed all that impressive, but it is certainly not negligible either: our preferred estimate lies in the vicinity of a 30-percent boost of bilateral exports from both countries belonging to the WTO. Our …ndings should also be of some relevance for the broader trade policy debate. It cannot be denied that preaching the virtue of WTO-type multilateralism is made somewhat more di¢ cult if we lack clear empirical evidence of membership e¤ects, either on policies or on trade. Hence, even a modest correction of the earlier scepticism should be welcome. And we do feel that a modest correction is warranted from our results. A corner solutions approach to the gravity equation, which allows for the WTO to have an in ‡uence on the amount of bilateral trade as well as on whether a country-pair trades at all, reveals that the low earlier estimates that were based on the amount of trade alone su¤er from a downward bias. In addition, the extensive-marginvariation does suggest that membership plays a non-negligible role in creating trading relationships between countries that would otherwise not trade with each other at all. After all, "GATT think"is not entirely unfounded empirically.
We certainly have not had the …nal word. Future work should focus on methodological re…nements, such as for instance a more satisfactory treatment of the "logof-zero-problem" in the log-linear speci…cation of the gravity equation, or a sharper distinction between missing observations and true zeros in the trade data. Related to this, one might also try to run a genuine sample selection story to the e¤ect that the …rst dollar of trade between any country pair is explained by factors di¤erent from those determining the amount of trade in an ongoing trading relationship. It would also be valuable to incorporate some explicit modelling of negotiations related to WTO accession, trying to …nd out in general terms what makes accession successful (in terms of "GATT think"). A particularly interesting extension of our analysis would be to explore the interaction between regional trading arrangements and WTO membership.
Do the trade e¤ects of such arrangements depend on whether or not the participant countries are also long-standing members of the WTO? For lack of space, we have not pursued such questions in this paper, but the technique that we have developed here is readily extended to do so.
In closing, we return to a point that we have argued in our introduction. The 22 ultimate cause of the GATT/WTO is not really to promote trade per se, but to free trade from barriers where these are harmful. In this regard, the verdict cannot be found by looking at trade ‡ows; one needs to look at trade policies. And even though there is some evidence that member countries did not systematically conduct more liberal trade policies, the rationale of the GATT/WTO as an institution does not strictly hinge on any such e¤ect either. Bagwell & Staiger (2003) suggest that the WTO serves a useful purpose in avoiding welfare costs from ine¢ cient non-cooperative policy equilibria.
Observing that countries who are members of the WTO do not systematically follow freer (and thus, presumably, less costly) trade policies than non-members, does not invalidate the Bagwell-Staiger case for the WTO: They might still pursue less costly policies than would be the case, if the WTO had not been available as an institution.
The same goes, if we …nd scant evidence that they have more trade than non-members. Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. All regressions include country i and time fixed effects (not shown). Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Specification (2) contains time fixed effects. All specifications contain a constant (not shown). Note: Standard errors in paranthesis, * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%. The dependent variable is the natural log of nominal exports from country i to country j. Coefficient estimates for country fixed effects and the constant are not reported for brevity. The number of observations used in the Probit model is lower than in the Tobit case (and sometimes even than in the OLS case), because a large number of outcomes is perfectly predicted by the fixed effects, so that the associated observations are dropped. The linear probability model, that does not suffer from this problem, yields results very similar to the probit case. Note: Robust standard errors (adjusted for clustering within groups of country pairs) in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. All specifications (except PROBIT) include constants (not shown), and various fixed effects (not shown). Adjacencyij 0,03 0,16 0,00 1,00
Common languageij 0,18 0,38 0,00 1,00 Free trade agreementij 0,10 0,30 0,00 1,00
